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There are, perhaps, three aspects of Hugh Clegg’s paper, ‘The Bullock Report 
and European Experience’,1 that strike the contemporary reader most forcibly. 
The first is how alien it all seems: the past really does feel like ‘a foreign 
country’.2 Writing in 1977, Clegg’s analysis of the potential role of worker 
directors appointed to the boards of UK companies was set against the 
background of an industrial relations landscape that has long disappeared: a 
largely white, male working population, employed on generally secure 
employment contracts in an economy dominated in the private sector by 
unionized manufacturing companies. Blame for the country’s long-term industrial 
decline was pinned at the time, at least partly, on a fragmented industrial 
relations system that had led to wage drift, inflationary pressures and poor 
international competitiveness in consequence.  
Trade unions had frustrated all attempts by previous Labour and 
Conservative governments to introduce statutory incomes policies, so the Labour 
governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (1974–79) were trying a 
new approach, the Social Contract. Under this arrangement, unions agreed to 
voluntary pay restraint in exchange for a wide range of ‘social wage’ benefits 
designed to favour working people, including price and rent controls, public 
transport and housing subsidies, measures to redistribute income and wealth, 
public control of capital investment, an active labour market policy, the repeal of 
anti-union legislation enacted by the Conservative government, and – 
significantly – the ‘fostering of industrial democracy’.3  
Among the measures designed to foster industrial democracy was the 
Bullock Report,4 the topic of Clegg’s paper delivered less than three months after 
its publication, which had proposed the introduction of worker directors on the 
boards of larger private companies in the UK, in line with the practice in certain 
other successful European economies, notably the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Sweden. No one at the time had any idea that the world of Bullock and the 
Social Contract was to be blown apart by the election of the Conservative 
government of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, which set out to destroy union 
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influence and to restore managerial prerogative at the workplace. Her success in 
achieving those objectives helps to explain the sense of alienation we have when 
reading Clegg’s paper today. 
And yet … And yet there is a second aspect about this paper which also 
strikes us, one that is arguably more significant. That is the sense of how 
familiar the central issue is that Clegg is addressing, namely how best to ensure 
the accountability of businesses to their workforces and other stakeholders. 
Recent years have witnessed a woeful litany of corporate scandals involving at 
best neglectful and at worst corrupt boardroom decisions: British Home Stores, 
which went bankrupt in 2016 with a colossal pension fund deficit; Sports Direct, 
which was found responsible for ‘some appalling working practices’5 by a 
parliamentary inquiry in the same year; Carillion, which went into liquidation in 
2018 having prioritized dividend payments over its pension liabilities; and GKN, 
taken over by Melrose, a firm known for asset stripping and workforce 
reductions, also in 2018. These scandals, among others, became so infamous 
that they provoked parliamentary inquiries and a certain promise from Theresa 
May MP as she announced her bid for leadership of the Conservative Party in 
July 2016:  
 
The people who run big businesses are supposed to be accountable to 
outsiders, to non-executive directors … [but] the scrutiny they provide is 
just not good enough. So if I’m Prime Minister, we’re going to change that 
system – and we’re going to have not just consumers represented on 
company boards, but employees as well.6 
Hence, some forty years after the publication of the Labour government’s 
White Paper, Industrial Democracy (1978),7 which had followed the Bullock 
Report with proposed statutory fall-back rights to board-level employee 
representation if company-level negotiations on bespoke arrangements failed, 
the Conservative government under Theresa May did indeed take steps to 
introduce a measure of employee voice into corporate boardrooms. After a 
Green Paper consultation and a select committee inquiry, it invited the Financial 
Reporting Council in 2017 to revise its Corporate Governance Code to require 
companies, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, to adopt ‘one of three employee 
engagement mechanisms: a designated non-executive director; a formal 
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employee advisory council; or a director from the workforce’.8 These provisions 
came into effect from 1 January 2019.  
Clearly these reforms are extremely weak. Indeed, a survey of fifty-seven 
FTSE all-share companies carried out in spring 2019 revealed that 73% would 
designate an existing non-executive director to represent employees and 27% 
would set up a workforce advisory panel, with a 5% overlap of companies 
combining a non-executive director with a panel. The remainder, a mere 5% 
(two companies), would opt for a director appointed from the workforce.9 
Nevertheless, the principle had been conceded – and it is a principle to which a 
future, more radical government could return – that widening the composition of 
the board of directors is a significant element in securing the fair representation 
of stakeholders such as employees on the boards of companies, and therefore 
their potential influence over the earliest stages of decision-making. For the 
earliest stages of decision-making are critical, as they involve strategic issues 
such as investments, new products, restructuring and location of operations. At 
sub-board level, by which time influence can be exerted merely over the 
operational aspects of decisions that have already been long taken, it is 
generally too little and certainly too late.  
From this principle of representation there emerges debate over the 
requirements for a practically effective system of board-level employee 
representation in the UK. And in this context, Clegg’s discussion – of supervisory 
boards, the minority status of worker directors and single-channel 
representation through trade unions – suddenly appears rather less alien. For 
Clegg raises issues that would require resolution by a radical government under 
any circumstances. Is it reasonable, for example, to place employee directors on 
unitary boards, or would it be more effective to introduce supervisory boards 
with an oversight function? European experience is ambivalent in this respect, 
and the answer depends very much on the historical trajectory of the country 
under review.10 To what extent are employee directors at a disadvantage when 
they are in a minority on the board? In legal terms, in not one of the eighteen of 
the twenty-seven member states of the European Union (EU) plus Norway that 
have systems of board-level employee representation can employee 
representatives outvote shareholder interests on the board, whether unitary or 
supervisory. In all cases, their success depends on their ability to resolve 
disputes ‘behind the scenes’, to delay decisions or to build coalitions of interests 
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over specific issues.11 And is trade-union membership a significant factor in 
explaining the influence of employee representation on company boards? Given 
the minority status of employee representatives across the EU and Norway, then 
what does seem significant for their success is their training and skills base, as 
well as their links to other workplace representatives and their deep 
understanding of employment relations in their own company. All these factors 
are linked to trade-union membership, which gives them the independence and 
confidence to deal with the complex issues that arise at board level.12  
It is noteworthy that such discussion of the practicalities of introducing 
board-level employee representation into the UK, both today and in the 1970s, 
continually harks back to European experience. This is hardly surprising given 
the length of experience that a country such as Germany has had in this respect 
(though in other countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, it is 
much more recent).13 Nevertheless, it raises the third striking aspect of Clegg’s 
paper, namely, the relevance of policy transfer theory to the whole debate. 
‘Policy transfer’, ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘cross-jurisdictional learning’ were not 
concepts in Clegg’s vocabulary at the time,14 but he was rightly concerned with 
an issue that could today be identified as central to that area of theory, namely, 
how relevant European experience actually was for policy-makers in the UK 
given the contrasting institutions, legal frameworks and cultures between the 
countries involved.  
The choice of worker directors as a key feature of the industrial relations 
systems in Germany and Sweden would be explained today as a ‘dominance 
effect’.15 That is, because economic power is spread unevenly between countries, 
there is a tendency for one or more to take the lead in developing ‘more 
efficient’ business and industrial relations practices (such as Fordist mass 
production in the USA in the 1920s or lean production in Japan in the 1950s). 
Lead societies create dominance effects, or best practices that become global or 
regional standards, which are subsequently imitated by other societies though 
generally without the even capacity to do so. Such was the case with worker 
directors in Germany and Sweden. As Clegg points out, the terms of reference of 
the Bullock Committee were ‘the need for a radical extension of industrial 
democracy in the control of companies by means of representation on boards of 
directors’ and also explicitly to take into account ‘experience in Britain, the EEC 
and other countries’.16 The notion of a dominance effect was therefore implicit in 
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the approach adopted by the Committee – though, as noted above, this rang 
some alarm bells for Clegg. To repeat his question: how relevant actually was 
European experience for policy makers in the UK?  
In the days before any coherent literature on policy transfer, Clegg’s 
analysis is likely to be seen today as partial rather than systematic, and itself 
raises three sets of questions for the contemporary reader. First, how accurate is 
his analysis? Is it true, for example, as he suggests, that the introduction of 
worker directors was intended to bear the brunt of unleashing workers’ abilities 
and improving industrial relations in the UK? He understandably describes these 
claims as ‘flights of fancy’ if true (p. 5.9), but has Clegg understood the 
objectives behind the Bullock Report correctly? Or has he rather overlooked its 
context within the Social Contract? Second, what was the role of the European 
Economic Community (EEC, now the European Union, EU) in promoting worker 
directors? Clegg failed even to mention, let alone examine, the EEC’s draft Fifth 
Directive on the structure of public limited companies (1972), which was acting 
as a ‘push’ factor towards worker directors alongside the ‘pull’ factors reflected 
in the Bullock Report.17 What relevance might the Directive have had on turning 
an optional measure under the Social Contact into a compulsory one enforceable 
by the European Court of Justice? And third, the question that leads on from the 
second, how does more recent research on policy transfer and ‘lesson-learning’ 
across national boundaries help to bring Clegg’s concerns about the relevance of 




The Bullock Report and its place in the Social Contract 
 
After its election in October 1974, the Labour government had rapidly enacted 
measures designed to strengthen collective bargaining and promote the 
influence of the unions in the formulation of economic and industrial strategy. 
The objectives of its Alternative Economic Strategy included economic reflation, 
public ownership, planning agreements, controls on prices and imports as well as 
industrial democracy.18 It reflected the views of the time about the role of 
tripartite bodies, such as the National Economic Development Council and the 
Manpower Services Commission, in running economic policy. Nationalization 
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policies, planning agreements, sector working parties and the creation of the 
National Enterprise Board extended the principle of government intervention, but 
did not create it.19 
These measures formed the backbone of the Social Contract with the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC), which dominated the relationships between 
government, employers and unions over this period.20 Stuart Holland, one of the 
minds behind the Alternative Economic Strategy, argued that ‘if organized labour 
intends to secure advances for the working class as a whole, it must use its 
bargaining power through the Social Contract for dramatic progress towards key 
features of such a programme [the AES] in one parliament’.21 It was in this 
context that certain sections of the labour movement developed an interest in 
board-level representation in contrast with the period ten years earlier, when the 
consensus had still emphasized collective bargaining between unions and 
employers as the principal means of securing influence in industry.22 Clegg was 
therefore acting either inaccurately or mischievously when he alleges that the 
Bullock Report intended worker directors to carry the burden of reforming 
industrial relations in the UK. The Report, and the subsequent White Paper, were 
merely pieces in the much larger jigsaw of the Social Contract. Reform was 
multi-faceted and included all the interlocking pieces noted above. 
He was on much firmer ground when he declared that he did not know 
any authority in Germany ‘who does not attach far more importance to works 
councils than to worker representation on boards in explaining the working of 
German industrial relations since the war’ (p. 5.10), a point supported by Sir 
Otto Kahn-Freund, who was chairing Clegg’s session (p. 5.24D).23 Indeed, the 
German system has traditionally – at least until reunification in the early 1990s 
– kept areas of potential consensus at the workplace (which are dealt with by 
the works councils) separate from those areas of conflict (which are dealt with 
by the unions through collective bargaining, generally at sector level). This 
distinction, and the legal framework within which industrial relations are 
conducted, has played a significant role in helping to contain strike levels in 
Germany since 1945. Nevertheless, Clegg did not go far enough in explaining 
the favourable influences on German economic development, which go well 
beyond industrial relations to include the role of the banks and the stock market, 
as well as the relatively concentrated ownership of companies, all of which has 
contributed to the long-term perspectives of German industry, its focus on 
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‘patient capital’ and hence its productivity.24 The successful transfer of such 
aspects of the German system into a liberal-market economy like the UK would 




The role of the EEC in encouraging debate about worker directors 
 
UK accession into the EEC in 1973 focused the attention of the labour movement 
on the issue of worker directors, and opened up a new area for negotiations in a 
way unforeseen in the 1960s.25 One of the aims of the EEC was to harmonize 
company law between member-states, which meant adoption of the draft Fifth 
Directive with its controversial provisions for employee representation on 
supervisory boards. This measure may today be viewed as an instance of ‘direct 
coercive transfer’ – that is, one where the EEC attempted to impose transfer on 
to member-states by means of a directive which is legally binding and 
enforceable through the European Court of Justice, once adopted by the Council 
of Ministers.26  
The Conservative government (1970–74), committed to EEC membership, 
also apparently supported this Directive. Edward Heath, the Prime Minister, 
believed that entry into the EEC could help to improve British industrial relations, 
as Clegg notes (p. 5.21D), and the Commission on Industrial Relations duly 
produced a report analysing the extent of employee board-level representation 
across the EEC and its impact on industrial relations.27 The role of the EEC in 
promoting industrial democracy was widely acknowledged at the time. For 
example, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce observed that ‘this 
groundswell of ideas towards greater “industrial democracy” – however defined 
and understood – has been swept into prominence by the activities of the 
European Economic Community’.28 
The views of Jack Jones, then general secretary of the Transport and 
Workers’ Union (TGWU), are significant here. He noted that part of the Social 
Contract consisted in a commitment to an Industrial Democracy Act designed to 
increase workers’ control of industry, interest in which had been stimulated by 
closer contact with the EEC and European trade unions: ‘It meant a lot to me 
personally. From my youthful days I had been associated with the extension of 
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collective bargaining. Now I saw the possibility of elected shop stewards taking 
their place in the boardrooms of private companies and publicly-owned 




When it became known by the General Council [of the TUC] that Mr Heath 
was going to propose supervisory boards with one-third representation for 
workers, Jack Jones said to his colleagues, ‘Look, the one thing you 
cannot do is to say “No”. When a Conservative Prime Minister says 
“Unions, do you want to go on the board?”, you can’t say “No, we reject 
this, Prime Minister”. That’s not the way to negotiate … If the 
management comes and asks you if you want something, you don’t say 
that you don’t want it: you say you want more.’ Anyway, he said fifty 
percent. (p. 5.21D) 
 
The TUC Annual Congress in 1973 accordingly accepted the TUC’s 
proposals for 50:50 representation on supervisory boards, adding the following 
year that such appointments would be acceptable only if made through trade-
union machinery at company level.30 It was believed in some quarters that the 
presence of worker directors on company boards would help to achieve union 
influence outside the scope of collective bargaining. The principal reason for TUC 
interest in worker directors lay, therefore, in the appreciation that collective 
bargaining did have certain limitations which board representation – the chance 
of which the EEC presented – could possibly overcome:  
 
Major decisions on investment, location, closures, takeovers and mergers, 
and product specialisation of the organisation, are generally taken at 
levels where collective bargaining does not take place, and indeed are 
subject matter not really covered by collective bargaining. New forms of 
control are needed.31 
 
Bill Wedderburn, who spoke alongside Clegg at the Leicester conference, 
also stressed this point in his own presentation.32 By the mid-1970s, then, 
considerable pressure had built up around the idea of worker directors, set 
largely in the context of evidence from overseas. The idea was related to UK 
entry into the EEC and it was, in British terms, a new departure in industrial 
democracy. In the context of the Social Contract, it accordingly stimulated new 
debates which became focused on the deliberations of the Bullock Committee.  
Clegg does not address the central issue about how to plug these 
limitations in collective bargaining other than to comment that minority worker 
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representation on boards is ‘a poor instrument for achieving the radical changes 
in industrial relations and performance that the Bullock Committee were seeking’ 
(p. 5.3). It is not clear whether he believed that unions simply cannot have a 
say over strategic decisions at board level however important they are for their 
members’ future (because such a move would undermine their principal 
function, collective bargaining), or whether they should not (because otherwise 
they would lose their independence), or maybe both.  
 
 
Policy transfer and lesson-drawing 
 
There is some evidence today (contrary to Clegg’s opinion) that even minority 
board-level employee representation does in fact help to protect workers’ 
interests in a variety of ways.33 Whether or not, neither of the proposals for 
worker directors examined in this commentary was ever implemented. The 1978 
White Paper diluted the Bullock report in several ways, but was never enacted 
because the Conservative government of 1979 was fiercely anti-union in its 
industrial relations policies. The draft Fifth Directive, even though later amended 
to reflect a wider range of representation models, was eventually withdrawn in 
2004. While theories of ‘dominance effects’ and ‘direct coercive transfer’ help to 
explain the origins of the proposals for worker directors – through the Bullock 
Report and the EEC respectively – the question remains why they both failed so 
miserably in the UK but why the proposals from the Financial Reporting Council 
were successfully implemented on a ‘comply or explain’ basis from January 
2019.  
Contemporary research into policy transfer and cross-jurisdictional 
learning – which of course long postdates the work of Clegg – provides a helpful 
framework for comparing and contrasting the evolution of the debate on worker 
directors in the UK and in the EEC. ‘Policy transfer’ has been defined as ‘a 
dynamic whereby knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements or 
institutions is used across time or space in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements and institutions elsewhere’.34 The literature 
examines the processes involved in the transfer of policies generally between 
countries, their content and the rationales involved.35 While much of the 
research focuses on cases of successful transfer, Clegg was attempting to 
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explain why he thought the introduction of worker directors would not work, as 
an example of policy failure. His contribution to the conference reveals the way 
in which he was groping towards some answers – namely, that policy makers 
were not paying sufficient attention to the contexts of the institutions involved, 
in this case, the role of shop stewards in the UK in contrast to the role of works 
councils in Germany. The issue is why so many, though not all, influential policy-
makers then did believe that worker directors could be introduced successfully 
into the UK on the basis of continental systems. In this context, it should be 
noted that one sceptic – Otto Kahn-Freund, who was chairing the conference – 
had already warned against the misuses of comparative law: he had analysed 
the failures of the collective aspects of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 largely 
in terms of its misappropriation of Australian and American models. He had 
concluded: ‘any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its 
origin continues to entail the risk of rejection’.36 
There are two facets to the explanation, which can be couched in today’s 
terminology of policy-transfer theory. The first focuses on the German and Dutch 
models of board-level employee representation used by the Commission of the 
EC when drawing up its draft Fifth Directive. Early versions of the Directive 
‘owed much to the work of Germans on the Commission’s staff’37 at a time when 
Germany was extensively admired for its high-wage, high-productivity economy 
based on industrial consensus (the dominance effect observed above). It had 
been drafted before UK accession into the EEC in 1973, so it broadly reflected 
the system of corporate governance of the original six member-states, which 
corresponded – in the classic terminology of David Soskice – to the co-ordinated 
market economy model, rather than to the liberal market economy model 
predominant in the UK, which at that stage was not even considered.38 
The second facet concerns the practicalities of the proposed transfer from 
a co-ordinated market economy model into the UK. The ‘transfer’ was intended 
by the Labour government as a model for the UK even though the German 
system, as a co-ordinated market economy, arguably presents the greatest 
contrasts within Europe with that of the UK as a liberal market economy.39 
Institutional and legal constraints were largely ignored, as Clegg pointed out, 
even though the ‘object’ of transfer was an institution firmly embedded into the 
German industrial relations system.40 Clegg accordingly focused specifically on 
the contrasting roles and responsibilities of shop stewards in the UK and works 
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councils in Germany – their different status in law, the lowly status of unions at 
the German workplace and their differences in accountability, among others (pp. 
5.6-5.8).41 He concluded: 
 
British shop stewards would no doubt occupy a key role in the operation 
of a worker director system if one were instituted in Britain; but given the 
wide differences between works councils and shop stewards, this role 
might be expected to be very different from that played by the German 
works council (p. 5.8). 
 
One of the most significant differences would have been nomination of 
worker directors. In German companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees, 
nominations are made by the works council or by 10% of employees (or 100 if 
this is a smaller number); in larger companies, a proportion is also nominated by 
the unions, but only a proportion.42 By contrast, the single-union channel of 
nominations envisaged in the Bullock Report – for which, as Clegg noted, ‘they 
had no alternative if their proposals were to be accepted by the unions (p. 5.8) – 
would have given a domination to shop stewards’ networks, an outcome that 
may have been welcomed by Jack Jones but was robustly opposed by the 
employers. The Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF), for example, objected 
in its evidence to the Bullock Committee to the ‘enforced representation of 
employees on boards of directors’ and to ‘the appointment of employee directors 
as nominees of trade unions’.43 Underlying its objection lay employers’ fears of 
the extension of collective bargaining into the boardroom, a fear unknown in 
Germany precisely because of its separation of works council and union 
responsibilities. Pat Lowry, former director of the EEF and in 1977 director of 
industrial relations at British Leyland, declared at the same conference: 
 
I certainly find it totally offensive to think that discussions of important 
items in the boardroom should be based on the ‘we and you’ approach 
which is the hallmark of collective bargaining.44 
 
Such a view would have been – and would be still – inconceivable in Germany.  
Meanwhile, actual British experience with board-level employee 
representation is sparse, though one study of seven private-sector companies 
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with such representation carried out between 1976 and 1979 concluded that the 
schemes were generally not ‘distributive’ but rather ‘inspired by an incorporative 




The long shadow of Bullock 
 
Though Clegg himself did not attempt to theorize the contrasts between the UK 
and Germany as later analysts were to do, it is remarkable that Alan Fox had 
done just that in a paper that had gone largely forgotten until recently. Fox drew 
a key distinction between forms of ‘vertical bonding’ in the processes of 
industrialization in the two countries. He stated: 
 
In Britain the rising class of bourgeois entrepreneurs were creatures of a 
society and culture in which feudal and manorial vertical bondings, 
underpinned by paternalist-dependence relations and ideology, had been 
undermined and corroded for a period of two centuries or more. In 
Germany such vertical bonding survived up to the process of 
industrialization, which occurred late, quickly and thoroughly, with its 
‘take-off’ period in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.47 
 
In other words, Fox saw contrasting forms of ‘vertical bonding’ as a key 
distinction between the UK and Germany. In the UK, where it had become 
loosened, employers felt little responsibility for their workers, which had 
encouraged the development of independent working-class institutions, notably 
unions, based on adversarial attitudes towards the bosses. In Germany, 
employers felt a greater sense of responsibility, which encouraged the 
development of the more consensual relationships that largely endure to this 
day. These contrasting attitudes – adversarial and consensual – underpin much 
of the contemporary analysis of liberal and co-ordinated market economies. Fox 
was clearly ahead of his time. 
It remains significant that, faced by a crisis of confidence in the probity of 
corporate governance in the UK, Theresa May as Prime Minister resorted to 
some form or other of board-level employee representation as a possible 
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solution. The version introduced by the Financial Reporting Council in 2017, as 
noted earlier, is  enforceable only on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, and offers 
companies three anaemic options: a designated non-executive director, an 
advisory panel or a director appointed from the workforce. Early indications 
suggest a paltry take-up of the director option, which – in any case – raises 
none of the challenges of power distribution that concerned Clegg when 
analysing the Bullock Report: the role of supervisory boards, the minority status 
of worker directors and single-channel representation through trade unions. 
However, given Fox’s examination of vertical bonding, and subsequent research 
by others into the distinctions between co-ordinated and liberal market 
economies, the Financial Reporting Council options may be seen as ‘a Very 
British Solution’ to the problem of corporate governance: achievable but feeble. 
Unlike the 1978 White Paper, which was never enacted, they have been 
successfully introduced by cutting not against but with the historical grain,48 the 
grain of the UK national business system which embodies voluntarism, 
individualism and non-government intervention, not to mention avoidance of 
union influence.  
The discussion comes full circle, and it is now possible to understand 
better our reactions to Clegg’s paper. Initially, and superficially, it seems alien as 
it describes a world of industrial relations long gone. The collectivist solutions 
proposed by Bullock were overtaken by the election of the Conservative 
government in 1979. Yet, on a more thoughtful reading, we are struck by the 
familiarity – the enduring nature – of the underlying issues that Bullock was 
attempting to address, that bubbled up again under the Cameron (2010–16) and 
May (2016–19) governments, in the form of scandals, soaring executive pay, 
worker exploitation and lack of corporate accountability to broader stakeholders. 
And then, at the most analytical level, the insights revealed by more recent 
research into policy transfer inform our contemporary understanding of the 
barriers to Bullock. Clegg was correct when he argued: ‘there is no evidence at 
all in the Bullock Report from which to predict the consequences of implementing 
the majority proposals’ (p. 5.11). However, while his view was based largely on 
a recognition of the principal differences between Germany and the UK, ours is 
based on a deeper and more systematic penetration into the contrasting 
characteristics between co-ordinated and liberal market economies. The 
Financial Reporting Council options, then, undoubtedly reflect the most that 
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would be acceptable to the private sector given the balance of power currently 
prevailing in the UK.  
That said, John McDonnell, then Labour’s Shadow Chancellor, announced 
in September 2018 that under a Labour government ‘a third of the seats on 
company boards will be allocated to workers’. He added that shares would be 
transferred into an Inclusive Ownership Fund to be managed by workers, to give 
them ‘the same rights as other shareholders to have a say over the direction of 
their company’.49 The TUC, which has campaigned to reform corporate 
governance for many years, also continues to include board-level employee 
representation among its policies.50 The Labour Party lost the general election in 
December 2019, but these policies demonstrate that Bullock casts a long 
shadow. If Labour were to win at any time in the future on a platform to 
introduce worker directors on to the boards of UK companies, its principal 
challenge would be to learn the lessons from Bullock: that reforming labour 
relations and corporate governance requires a coherent package of radical 
policies, certainly, but that they also need to be carefully tailor-made to UK 
institutions and legal frameworks and not imported from abroad merely on the 
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